This special issue of the Review of Network Economics is dedicated to celebrating the achievements of Professor Alfred Kahn in commemoration of his 90 th birthday. The articles in this special issue examine a range of topics in the economics of regulation, antitrust and public policy, as applied to the telecommunications, electric power, railroad and airline industries. And in the spirit of the man himself, these articles are motivated by real-world problems, "rigorous" and yet accessible to policymakers and practitioners alike.
Introduction
This special issue of the Review of Network Economics is dedicated to celebrating the achievements of Professor Alfred E. Kahn in commemoration of his 90 th birthday. Articles in this special issue examine various aspects of economic regulation, antitrust or public policy in a manner that reflects the influence of Professor Kahn and his many contributions to economics and public policy. And like the man himself, these articles are motivated by real-world problems, "rigorous" and yet accessible to policymakers and practitioners in the field. In a very real sense every modern-day student of regulation and competition policy is a student of Kahn and his teachings -teachings that trace their lineage back to Joseph Schumpeter and his "perennial gale of creative destruction". A few words about the man and his career are in order before summarizing each of the articles in this special issue.
It is a daunting task to attempt to sum up in just a few pages a brilliant and pathbreaking career that spans more than six decades, but we shall try. Professor Kahn's contributions to the economics literature are extraordinary by any measure. These are summarized in curriculum vitae that run more than 30 pages. His publication record includes over 130 articles -many in the profession's most prestigious journals. In fact, of Professor Kahn's first ten publications, seven appeared in the American Economic Review, the Journal of Political Economy or the Quarterly Journal of Economics. In addition, he has published eight books, including his timeless, two-volume treatise -The Economics of Regulation (Kahn, 1988) . Perhaps we should have expected nothing less from someone who graduated first in his class from New York University at the age of 18! Never content simply to "preach" from the Ivory Tower and let others do the heavylifting, Professor Kahn took a number of leaves from academia to preside over the implementation of the economic principles that he championed.
1 These include such highlevel, government appointments as the Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission, Economic Advisor to the President (Carter) on Inflation, Chairman of the Council on Wage and Price Stability and Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), among others. As chairman of the CAB, he led the charge to deregulate the nation's airlines. The economic welfare gains associated with airline deregulation have been conservatively estimated at more than $28 billion annually. And, Fred would not want you to forget that airline deregulation occurred when a Democrat occupied the White House. It is widely known that Professor Kahn felt that he was better suited to head the FCC rather than the CAB, once remarking that "I really don't know one plane from another. To me they are all marginal costs with wings." But President Carter had other plans for him and his leadership of the CAB through the turbulent political economy of airline deregulation is, of course, now legendary.
A few years back, when the lights literally went out in California, the U.S. Congress once again turned to Professor Kahn to help them to understand the source of this market failure. He is, of course, no stranger to the U.S. Congress, having testified before the Senate or the House no less than 70 times previously. Fred Kahn has been the "great communicator" of economic principles for more than 60 years and he continues to advise Fortune 500 corporations and governments throughout the world. He has been a regular commentator on the Nightly Business Report.
There is more you should know about Professor Kahn. He has, since 1982, served as a consultant to the American Heritage Dictionary and lays claim to being the lone surviving student of the great economist, Joseph Schumpeter. In his spare time, Fred is a fan of theatrical comedy and not just as a spectator. With a preference for Gilbert and Sullivan, he has appeared in numerous plays on the Cornell campus and surrounding areas -word has it to critical acclaim.
On a more personal note, we have had the high honour and distinct privilege to have worked with Fred and learn at the foot of the master so to speak. There is certain richness and worldliness to Fred Kahn's economics ("political economy") that is timeless in nature and that has managed to transcend the technical transformation of the discipline.
2 His achievements as an economist are eclipsed only by the integrity, graciousness and kindness with which he has treated others and lived his entire life. 3 We have been awed time and again by Fred's willingness not only to listen intently and earnestly to arguments advanced 1 See McCraw (1984) for a comprehensive discussion of Professor Kahn's public service career. 2 Indeed, many of the analyses contained in The Economics of Regulation anticipated the debates surrounding the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act more than a quarter of a century later. As a result, Professor Kahn's earlier (as well as later) works were cited in important regulatory and court decisions related to that Act. For example, he cogently explained how footnote 91 of Volume I described the economic flaws in the Federal Communications Commission's approach for setting prices for the wholesale network elements the 1996 telecom act required incumbents to provide. As William Fellner long ago recognized, when technology is relentlessly reducing costs, businesses have to charge more in early years if they hope to recover their investments -a reality that the FCC's approach had overlooked. 3 A recent account of Professor Kahn's multiple stints as a regulator and deregulator concluded with the observation: "I have never heard a single person say a bad word about Alfred Kahn." (McKernan, 2008 Using the simple metric of market penetration, which incorporates both demand and supply effects, the relative effectiveness of rival policies can be appraised. If "open access" tends to protect innovation in applications without deterring investment in high-speed networks, then such rules should promote subscriber growth. Differences across regimes, both in time and technologies, can be observed to reveal incremental effects.
Hazlett's article considers three distinct regimes governing the two leading technologies for residential broadband. Prior to 1Q2003, CM service was unregulated (and has remained so), while DSL was subject to network unbundling mandates that included "line sharing" rules enabling rival Internet Service Providers to access last-mile loops at (very low) incremental cost. During this period, CM service enjoyed nearly a two-to-one market share advantage.
In 1Q2003, line-sharing rules were eliminated by the FCC. Wholesale access prices for third-party DSL suppliers rose sharply, deterring this form of rivalry. Yet, despite that decline, overall DSL subscribership strongly increased relative to historical trend. This statistically significant growth spurt is not explained either by contemporaneous CM subscriber growth or by contemporaneous subscriber growth in Canadian broadband (CM and DSL) markets. Such controls adjust for technology and economic developments unconnected to the U.S. regime changes. Again, the decrease in open access rules is correlated with an increase in subscriber growth.
A further deregulation occurred in 3Q2005 when the FCC classified DSL as an "information service". This essentially gave telephone carriers regulatory parity with unregulated cable TV systems in the broadband market. Opponents of the measure, including one FCC Commissioner, predicted that the deregulatory action would slow broadband deployments. Yet, the pre-existing DSL growth trend further increased, adjusting (again) for contemporaneous CM and Canadian broadband markets. Across all three regimes, then, subscriber growth is positively correlated with deregulation. The magnitudes of growth change are large. Quarterly DSL subscriber additions, lagging behind cable by about two-to-one prior to 2003, pulled ahead of CM subscriber additions in 2005. By year-end 2006, DSL subscribership was about 65% above the linear growth trend established in the regulated pre-1Q2003 era -approximately ten million more households than predicted. This evidence, in sum, is consistent with the view that broadband regulation deters network growth, and that imposing modularity on networks can disrupt efficient forms of vertical integration.
Indeed, the power of the evidence should be raised by the opposition expressed by Alfred Kahn to the 2003 DSL deregulation. Noting that the line-sharing rules gave entrants the right to use sunk capital at low prices, and that the infrastructure in question -for traditional voice networks -had been constructed without any expectation that additional broadband revenues would be forthcoming, the economic intuition was that this would have little if any impact on investment going forward. Yet, the prediction that view yields is that DSL growth would decline with deregulation, when the opposite result obtained. This makes a strong case for vertical efficiencies, and against regulatory separation.
Crandall
Professor Kahn's 1998 book, Letting Go: Deregulating the Process of Deregulation, suggested that regulators step aside once they have set basic rules for entry into erstwhile monopolized markets. Unfortunately, communications regulators (and Congress) have not heeded Professor Kahn's advice. They have too often maintained a detailed, interventionist approach while espousing deregulation, trying to encourage or even subsidize entrants and protecting the many of the beneficiaries of the old regulated regime. In this article, Crandall provides an analysis of the effects of three exercises in U.S. telecom regulation or "deregulation": (1) the post-1996 unbundling regime launched by the FCC and implemented by state regulators as a mechanism to facilitate entry into local telecommunications markets; (2) the continuation and extension of the high-cost "universal service" program funded by the taxation of long-distance telephony; and (3) the FCC's attempt to regulate the cable television rates under the 1992 Cable Act. The U.S. wholesale unbundling regime was prolonged and expanded in the face of early signs of failure. None of the entrants using the incumbents' unbundled local loops was able to operate profitably despite the FCC's liberal rules and the low wholesale rates imposed by the states. Rather than scale back the program in response to its obvious failure, the FCC continued to expand its scope. Crandall shows that this policy invited publicly-traded entrants to invest more than $40 billion to attract 11 million customers with almost no consumer welfare gains. The FCC persevered for a decade because of the lobbying power of the entrants, particularly AT&T and WorldCom-MCI.
The high-cost universal service program has grown rapidly over the last decade as the FCC has attempted to offset some of the effects of its rate rebalancing on small rural carriers. Ironically, a policy designed to reduce long distance rates because of telecom liberalization generated another policy to tax them. Even more troubling is that there is no evidence that the high-cost subsidy program is necessary or that it increases rural telephone penetration. Crandall shows that for one state, Iowa, the subsidies plus local subscriber rates are higher than the rates of unsubsidized rural services. Moreover, unsubsidized cable television rates in Iowa are no higher than urban rates in the state. This casts doubt on whether a high-cost program is even necessary. The program continues, however, because of the political strength of the thousands of small, inefficient telephone carriers who support it.
Finally, Crandall's article turns to a program that created no benefits for anyone and which was abandoned by the FCC within three years of its launch, namely, the regulation of cable television rates. This regulatory program was required by the 1992 Cable Act, which, in turn, was a response to the fact that cable operators increased channel offerings when they were deregulated by the 1984 Cable Act. More channels of service increased quality for subscribers, but they also resulted in higher monthly cable rates, inducing Congress to impose rate regulation. The attempt to regulate rates resulted in a slowed pace of new program service offerings, therefore, reduced consumer welfare. By 1995, the FCC realized its error, and it was induced simply to abandon the effort because there were no beneficiaries of the program and therefore no one lobbying for its continuation.
Robinson-Weisman
This article focuses on the means by which competition has been pursued as a regulatory policy in the U.S. telecommunications industry. The principles that form the core theme of this article are those that Fred Kahn has long articulated: (1) competition, when it is durable in nature, is always to be preferred to economic regulation; (2) regulatory policies should not confuse mandating the competitive outcome with fostering the competitive process -dynamic efficiency always trumps static efficiency; (3) the regulator should not be in the business of second-guessing the marketplace or putting his proverbial hand on the scale a la competitive handicapping; (4) the legacy to which every regulator should aspire is that of taking the "long view" and obviating to the greatest extent possible the need for a successor.
Robinson and Weisman explore the role of the essential facilities doctrine in circumscribing the scope of network sharing obligations in telecommunications. They argue that a proper application of the doctrine of essential facilities -or any principle of sharing assets among competitors -should recognize the prominence of dynamic over static efficiency in promoting consumer welfare. They observe that regulators may be averse to recognizing these tradeoffs because unlike the behavior of prices the welfare losses from foregone innovation may be unobservable to the regulators' constituency.
The incentives that characterize regulators' behaviour may explain departures from the essential facilities doctrine, according to Robinson and Weisman. First, regulators have a natural preference for short term results. The political basis for such a preference is partly framed by the short-term tenure of most regulators and paternalistic protection for new entrants. This may explain the unfounded faith in the stepping-stone hypothesis, that extensive sharing obligations would jump-start competition, in general, and facilities-based competition, in particular, as well as the practice of asymmetric regulation. To wit, does the "helping hand" of the regulator serve to obviate the need for such assistance more quickly or only ensure that such assistance will be needed in perpetuity? Second, there is a regulatory bias to favor policies the effects of which are measurable by the agency's political overseers. The number of competitors is one such easy thing to measure as is the number of bankruptcies. Third, regulators may understand that competition stands apart from the participants who engage in it. And yet, when a regulator is charged with the task of ensuring that the competitive process works, it is not always easy to abstract the process from the participants in it. Regulators may embrace competition as a theory, but they do not embrace the "gale of creative destruction" that Schumpeter famously defined as real competition. That kind of competition is messy and it is not politically palatable when the bodies of failed competitors pile up on the regulator's watch. Fourth, cries of "unfair competition" are sometimes reinforced with demands for "fair regulation" in which all parties are placed on a "level playing field". The problem is that the seductive appeal of even-handedness too easily becomes an excuse for more regulation. Finally, regulatory agencies are sometimes said to be risk averse, and control is the usual form of insurance for regulatory risks. All else being equal this means that regulatory agencies are predisposed to attempt to avoid unplanned contingencies such as those that occur in competitive markets. This regulatory aversion towards uncertain outcomes is fundamentally at odds with the dynamic character of robust competition. Professor Kahn's policy prescription for "letting go" is acknowledgment of the crippling nature of this problem and its adverse effects on consumer welfare.
Joskow
This article focuses on theoretical developments in incentive regulation for natural monopolies and the application of incentive regulation principles to the regulation of electricity distribution and transmission networks in the United Kingdom (UK). 4 The electricity sector has been fully liberalized in the UK in that there is full unbundling of generation, retail supply, transmission and distribution service leading to competitive wholesale and retail markets for electricity.
Recent developments in incentive regulation theory recognize that the regulator is imperfectly informed about the regulated firm's cost, demand, and service quality. Because the regulated firm has better information than the regulator about these attributes, it can behave strategically to exploit this information. The combination of asymmetric information and firm responses to regulatory incentives confronts the design of a regulatory mechanism that maximizes social welfare (given asymmetric information) with a tradeoff between rent extraction (reducing the excess profit left to the firm) and efficiency incentives (efficient production by the regulated firm).
Conceptually, fixed-price contracts (price caps) are good at providing incentives for cost minimization, but bad at extracting the benefits of these lower costs for consumers. Cost-of-service contracts are good at aligning prices and costs, but the costs will be excessive due to suboptimal managerial effort. Perhaps not surprisingly, the optimal regulatory mechanism in the presence of imperfect and asymmetric information lies somewhere between these two extremes. The optimal regulatory mechanism will have a form similar to a profit sharing contract or a sliding scale regulatory mechanism, where the price that the regulated firm can charge is partially responsive to changes in realized costs and partially fixed ex ante. More generally, by offering the regulated firm a menu of costcontingent regulatory contracts with different cost-sharing provisions, the regulator can do even better than if it offers only a single profit-sharing contract.
A particular form of incentive regulation, price caps, was introduced for the regulated segments of the privatized electric gas, telephone and water utilities in the UK, New Zealand, Australia, and portions of Latin American, as well as in the regulated segments of the telecommunications industry in the U.S. Under price cap regulation, the regulator sets an initial price p o (or a vector of prices for multiple products). This price (or a weighted average of the prices for firms supplying multiple products or different types of customers) is then adjusted from one year to the next for changes in inflation (rate of input price increase or RPI) and a target productivity change factor, "x".
However, when the regulator has imperfect information about the firm's cost opportunities and must satisfy a balanced-budget constraint, pure "forever" price cap mechanisms are not optimal from the perspective of an appropriate tradeoff between efficiency incentives and rent extraction. In addition, any incentive regulation mechanism that provides strong incentives for cost reduction can lead to inefficient reductions in service quality.
"Forever" price caps are not commonly used in the regulation of electricity distribution and transmission networks. Some form of cost-based regulation is used to set an initial value for p o, and both p o and x are reset periodically based on cost realizations and (in the UK) the firm's performance relative to its peers. In addition, price caps are typically only one component of a larger portfolio of incentive mechanisms that include quality of service incentives. The UK has recently begun to use menus of incentive contracts to regulate the capital-related costs of electric distribution companies.
The most comprehensive study of the post-reform performance of the regional electricity distribution companies in the UK finds significant overall increases in productivity over the period 1990 to 2000, and lower real "controllable" distribution costs compared to a number of benchmarks. Distribution service quality in the UK, measured by supply interruptions per 100 customers and average minutes of service lost per customer, has improved as well in the UK since the restructuring and privatization initiative in 1990. The experience with the transmission system operator (SO) incentive mechanism in England and Wales reveals that, after the introduction of the SO incentive scheme in 1994, the SO's operating and congestion costs fell by about 40% over the next ten years.
While the empirical evidence on the effects incentive regulation mechanisms applied to electric distribution and transmission system in practice is still limited, the experience thus far is very encouraging.
Gaskins
Gaskins' article examines the relative success of railroad "deregulation" in the United States over the past thirty years. 5 The economic consequences have been significant. A failing rail industry has dramatically revived, and shippers have enjoyed lower rail rates. The renaissance of the deregulated railroads was driven by unprecedented cost reductions. The cost reductions were largely passed on to shippers in the form of lower rates. The productivity gains were so large that the residual gains captured by the railroads steadily improved their profitability.
After a quarter of a century, the newly prosperous railroads have exhausted their excess capacity, and rail rates are rising. These changed circumstances have generated substantial pressure to modify the residual regulation of railroad rates.
Unfortunately, the fundamental issue of rail regulation -the protection of "captive shippers" (those shippers served by a single railroad) -has never been fully resolved. The theory most applicable to this dilemma; that is, Ramsey pricing has been ignored by the regulators and the current regulatory process does not satisfy aggrieved shippers. The solution is not obvious, and it would appear that dramatic re-regulation could do serious harm. We are left with an imperfectly competitive industry governed by imperfect regulation.
A substantial proportion of Gaskins' article is based on his successive experience as a regulator, a railroad executive, and an expert witness in rate setting proceedings. As a Commissioner and later Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Gaskins participated in the implementation of the federal laws that transitioned the industry from regulated collective rate making, preservation of the market positions of particular carriers, and barriers to exit to a substantially deregulated industry in which carriers had much greater pricing and operational flexibility. As a Burlington-Northern executive, Gaskins changed pricing from one based on accounting costs to market-based approaches, such as an auction mechanism for grain transport prices. On the cost side, Burlington-Northern improved its utilization of available capacity and implemented cost-savings measures, such as labour force reductions and network consolidation through the abandonment or sale of unprofitable routes. Most recently, Gaskins has advocated economic pricing principles, such as Ramsey pricing, in rate disputes, albeit with limited success, as noted above.
Barrett
In this article, Barrett contends that Ireland represents a remarkable illustration of the outstanding success of the airline deregulation policies implemented by Alfred Kahn under President Carter almost thirty years before in 1978. A rare parliamentary revolt in 1984 against the Air Transport Bill, which would have fined, imprisoned and withdrawn the travel agent's licence for selling airline tickets below government approved prices led to the foundation of Ryanair in 1985, and the deregulation of the Dublin-London route in May 1986. Pressures for competition leading to this parliamentary revolt were staunchly resisted by Aer Lingus, which engaged in intense parliamentary and media pressures. Fred
Kahn's name became famous in the main Irish newspapers as his supporters engaged Aer Lingus in media and parliamentary debate. These developments reversed previous anticompetitive policies protective of national airlines both in Ireland and throughout Europe. For example, fears that the US would dominate post-war aviation in an Open Skies regime caused European governments to oppose free trade in aviation at the Chicago conference in 1944. Europe's national airlines shared revenues, divided markets between them and secured regulatory capture over their relevant government departments which became downtown offices of the national airline. New entrants were excluded and incumbent national airlines did not compete on price. In Ireland, Aer Lingus had achieved notable success in persuading governments not to permit new entrants in the aviation sector.
The results have been spectacular. Fares fell by 54% on the first day of deregulation. Passenger numbers on the route were 65% greater in 1987, the first full year of deregulation, than in 1985, the last full year of pre-deregulation policies. In 1985/6, on the eve of deregulation, the heavily protected state airline, Aer Lingus had 2.2m passengers. In 2008 under deregulation, four Irish airlines will carry 68m passengers, some 31 times more than passenger numbers before deregulation.
The market entry of Ryanair in 1985 and its expansion programme in the mid-1990s transformed European aviation. Product changes included the replacement of hubbing by point-to-point trips, the abolition of "free" food and drink service, seat allocation, and ticket sales through travel agents. The use of secondary airports, combined with twentyfive minute turnaround times, allowed Ryanair to bypass congested hub airports controlled by the incumbent airlines and to raise productivity to 11,000 passengers per staff member per year compared to 1,000 for the average member of the Association of European Airlines, the body representing Europe's traditional national airlines. Ryanair has become Europe's first pan-European airline with bases throughout the EU. By contrast, Europe's traditional legacy airlines are identified with their home countries.
The success of Ryanair at Europe's secondary airports has led to inter-airport competition. Europe has many airports that are no longer required for military use, or that were built by regional and local governments to promote regional development, and therefore are underutilized. Ryanair has secured low landing fees and airport charges, and passenger demand has increased due to lower fares and quality improvements, including less congestion, shorter walking distances and reduced waiting times in comparison with hub airports.
The results of Irish airline deregulation in terms of price reductions and service increases were more spectacular than was expected by even the most zealous Kahn supporter. A heavily protected national institution was demythologised, exposed to competition and privatised. The role of the state was reduced and competition and market forces flourished.
Ireland reassessed many other economic policies following the success of airline deregulation. The government's share in the economy was reduced, markets were opened up, tax burdens were reduced and unemployment rates plummeted. Ireland was transformed in the twenty years that followed airline deregulation. Kahn's aviation policies served as the genesis of that transformation by providing a striking example of market forces in action. The power of the vested interests was trounced by the power of ideas and these ideas in aviation came predominantly from Alfred Kahn.
Weiser
In the late 1970s, public choice theory had defeated the public interest theory of regulation. Just when the academy settled on this consensus, however, a number of deregulatory initiatives -namely, the abandonment of economic regulation of the airline industrybegan to emerge. Under the public choice theory of regulation, these initiatives, which were opposed by the incumbents who benefited from the legacy regulatory regime, should never have succeeded. Yet they did. The success of airline deregulation in the 1970s spurred a re-thinking of public choice theory and a search for explanations. A number of explanations have suggested the potential importance of "political entrepreneurs" as organizers of diffuse interests that, under certain circumstances, can actually overcome the concentrated interests that benefited from the status quo. To date, however, many commentators have only noted briefly that Fred Kahn fits the model of a political entrepreneur. By examining Kahn's model of political entrepreneurship more carefully, Weiser's Essay suggests that commentators and policymakers can better appreciate the necessary strategies for success in spurring an otherwise unlikely cause of regulatory reform.
Kahn's success as a political entrepreneur reflects his ability to succeed in three distinct areas. First, Kahn demonstrated an uncanny effectiveness in developing the public case for reform. Second, Kahn exhibited an ability and willingness to stretch the legal authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board to deregulate the airlines and make the changes imposed by the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act less stark. Third, Kahn also looked for and empowered those firms and groups that would benefit from regulatory reform. To succeed along these three dimensions, Kahn drew on his stature as a scholar, his evangelical belief in the need for reform, and his independence from regulatory politics as usual.
Kahn's accomplishments as a political entrepreneur do not negate entirely the lessons of public choice theory. Indeed, in the case of spectrum regulation, public choice theory explains, at least in part, the persistence of a legacy regulatory regime that values the protection of incumbent users very highly and devalues the importance of making access to spectrum available for new users. The question thus remains whether a political entrepreneur at the FCC could be successful along the lines of Kahn's leadership at the Civil Aeronautics Board. Weiser's Essay argues that such leadership is possible, but that it faces two formidable obstacles -the lack of any obvious congressional support and the very difficult challenge of developing any level of public appreciation for the benefits that would flow from regulatory reform in this area.
Kahn
In the final article published in this special issue, our honoree, Fred Kahn, discusses the odyssey that, perhaps unwittingly, carried him from economist to political entrepreneurfrom the ivory tower of Cornell University through a series of increasingly prominent government appointments (Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board and Inflation Czar under President Carter) and the talented economists and policymakers with whom he collaborated along the way. Interestingly, Professor Kahn contends that he was not a pre-convinced deregulator; in the case of airlines, the prevailing institutional and economic conditions led him to recognize the high costs of regulation and the possibilities of durable competition. Recounting his odyssey precisely demonstrates why Professor Kahn is one of the foremost scholars in the economics of regulated industries, and one of the most respected (de)regulators in the world. He was always led by a set of economic principles that circumscribed his actions. He combined those principles with his innate political skills to succeed where most academics would have failed. Professor Kahn's communication skills were at least as important as his scholarship in the successful implementation of the deregulatory proposals over which he presided.
Professor Kahn has long championed the principles of marginal cost pricing, and he examines these and related issues at length in Volume I of his two-part treatise (Kahn, 1988) . Interestingly, his intellectual pursuit of the merits of marginal cost pricing led him to ultimately reject his earlier call for two-part pricing of natural gas based on old and new discoveries. He came to the realization that "Whatever the merits of this rationalization, the simple economic efficiency preached in my Volume I requires that all supplies of a standardized product, whatever the differing circumstances of their discovery and production, be priced at the marginal cost of supply necessary to clear the market" (Kahn, 2008, 626) . The irony is that his two-price proposal for pricing natural gas -a proposal Kahn ultimately recognized to be incorrect -was what launched his career into public service. The rest, as they say, is history.
Professor Kahn comments ruefully on the purported triumph of the Chicago School in the realm of antitrust economics and public policy. His concerns include the Chicago School's disavowal of the possibility of predation, the approval of mergers to dominance or near-dominance, and standards of competitive conduct that are premised on whether such actions pose a non-transitory threat to consumer welfare rather than being unfair methods of competition.
Professor Kahn concludes his article with a few observations concerning net neutrality: an issue about which more has been said than need be said, as proponents offer solutions looking for a problem of dubious economic merit. For example, calls for uniform charges for all forms of Internet communications are inconsistent with the economic reality that differential prices reflecting different levels of quality are fully consistent with competitive markets. The only interventions clearly justified, at this time, would be ex post and antitrust-like in character (Professor Kahn's, not the Chicago School's conception of antitrust) -to detect and sanction discriminations against providers of content competitive with those of the carriers themselves -and refusals to interconnect with one another for the transmission of competitor-originating content.
